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A natural monopoly exists in a market where the entire demand can be
satisfied at lowest cost by one producer.' Natural monopolies typically arise
in the provision of services in small towns 2 or in the distribution of utilities.,
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1. See Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STA. L. Pv. 548, 548 (1969).
Posner states that "[i]f the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest
cost by one firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever
the actual number of firms in it." Id. Another recent attempt to define the natural monopoly
market introduces the concept of "subadditivity." See Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the
"State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 Tax. L. REv. 481, 492 (1982) (citing Baumol,
On the Proper Cost Test for Natural Monopolies in a Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON.
Rv. 809, 809 (1977)). Subadditivity is defined as follows:
If one firm can produce a given output at less cost than two or more firms, costs
for that output are said to be subadditive; that is production costs of one firm
are sub (less) than if one adds the cost of two or more firms that divide the out-
put. If one firm can produce at less cost than two or more firms, the costs are
said to be "globally subadditive."
Cirace, supra, at 492-93 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). As Cirace notes, this defini-
tion is little more than a reformulation of existing definitions. Id. at 493. It does not alter
the analysis presented in this article. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 n.8 (1974) (natural monopolies created by the economic forces of high threshold capita!
requirements and virtually unlimited economy of scale); Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City
of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (natural monopoly market has room for
only one firm); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1972)
(in a natural monopoly situation, successful competitor gets the market); Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (natural monopoly
arises where most efficient allocation of resources results in a single supplier). For an overview
of natural monopoly analysis, see R. SCsA.LENSES, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES
passim (1979).
Cases which discuss the "natural monopoly" that a manufacturer has over his own products
by virtue of trademark or patent, or simply because the product is unique, are not within
the scope of this article. See, e.g., Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1982);
Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978); Trixler Brokerage
Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1974); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc.
v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Penn. 1979).
2. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 621 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
III P. AREEDA & D. TUINER]. For a discussion of a case involving a small town monopoly,
see infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
3. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 621. For a discussion of the natural
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 33:465
Under natural monopoly conditions, competition cannot regulate the market
because inevitably only one firm will survive, or if two firms survive, pro-
duction will not be as efficient as possible.4
For the purposes of the antitrust law, the natural monopoly market poses
special difficulties. Section two of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... I
Since, by definition, a natural monopoly exists where economic factors dic-
tate only one supplier for the market, a sole supplier should not face antitrust
liability for achieving the position of a monopolist.6 Thus, an alleged
monopolist may argue that a natural monopoly provides an absolute defense
to a charge of monopolization under section two of the Sherman Act.7 This
article will survey the case law in an effort to resolve the issue of whether
natural monopoly conditions can or should provide an absolute defense for
an alleged monopolist.
monopoly defense in litigation involving regulated industries, see infra notes 56-69 and accom-
panying text.
4. See Posner, supra note 1, at 548. "If such a market contains more than one firm
• . . production will continue to consume more resources than necessary." Id.; cf. 2 A. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 318 (1971); R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL
MONOPOLIES 4 (1979); Hamilton & Hamilton, Duopoly in the Distribution of Electricity: A Policy
of Failure, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 281, 284 0983) (all three discussing large-scale duplication of
electric distribution facilities as wasteful and inefficient).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
6. See Lamb Enter., Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1972). As the Lamb
court noted, "[i]f success in such a venture could become a per se violation of the anti-trust
laws, the ultimate effect would be to stifle, rather than to encourage, competition and forma-
tion of new business enterprises." Id. at 514; see Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector,
Inc., 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974). The Greenville court noted that "[tihe characteristics of
a natural monopoly make it inappropriate to apply the usual rule that success in driving com-
petitors from the market is evidence of illegal monopolization.... This variance allows businesses
to compete fairly for a natural monopoly market, with assurance that the winner will not be
penalized." Id. at 397 (citations omitted). Both the Lamb and Greenville decisions addressed
the issue of monopolization of a natural monopoly market, which both courts agreed should
not be a per se violation. Both courts indicated, however, that the methods used to achieve
or maintain the position of monopolists could lead to an antitrust violation even in a natural
market. Greenville, 496 F.2d at 397; Lamb, 461 F.2d at 519.
7. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. (CEI), 538 F. Supp. 1306
(N.D. Ohio 1980). The City of Cleveland case is extensively reviewed in Austin, City of Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Co.: Monopolization, Regulation and Natural Monopoly, 13 U. TOL. L.
REv. 609 (1982). The case involved a 60-year battle between a municipal power company and
a privately held power company for control of the Cleveland service area. The defendant elec-
tric company invoked the defense of natural monopoly to justify the actions which it had taken
to gain control of the market. Id. at 610. The defendant argued that "[tihe contestants [should
be] free to fight it out, unencumbered by antitrust surveillance." Id. at 647. As Austin notes,
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In this context, a second issue will be addressed. While only one supplier
can exist in a natural monopoly market, the methods used to achieve the
position of a monopolist may be subject to the antitrust laws.' A competitor
may engage in unfair and predatory behavior to drive out competition and
then claim that it simply hastened the inevitable-one supplier for the market.9
Thus, whether the antitrust laws should be used to police behavior during
an elimination bout in a natural monopoly market must also be considered.
While many antitrust cases have addressed the issue of natural
monopolies,"0 its treatment by the courts has been neither clear nor consis-
however, a strong presumption exists against judicial exemptions from antitrust liability. Id.
at 649 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975)). Nevertheless, after
two jury trials CEI's defense succeeded. Austin, supra, at 609.
8. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass.
1959), aff'd as modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960). In Union Leader, Judge Wyzanski
recognized the unique problems posed by a natural monopoly, concluding that the intent to
gain power in such a market does not constitute exclusionary intent. Nonetheless, Wyzanski
noted that use of unfair means to achieve monopoly power could establish a charge of
monopolization. 284 F.2d at 584. For a further discussion of the Union Leader decision, see
infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
Several recent cases involving the newspaper industry demonstrate the confusion that exists
regarding the acts necessary to prove "exclusionary intent" and an attempt to monopolize.
The cases all involve the decision by a newspaper publisher to implement its own distribution
system, rather than rely on independent distributors. These decisions indicate that as long as
the publisher has legitimate business reasons for the decision, or if the change will increase
efficiency, the switch to self distribution is lawful. See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d
843 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 683 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1982); Naify v. McClatchy Newspapers,
599 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1979); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp.
292 (D.R.I. 1980), rev'd, 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981); Neugebauer v. A.S. Abell Co., 474
F. Supp. 1053 (D. Md. 1979); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 441 F. Supp.. 349 (W.D.
Mo. 1977), vacated and remanded, 605 F.2d 4093 (8th Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehearing, 695
F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982) (panel opinion), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Newberry
v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977); Hardin v. Houston Chronicle Pub-
lishing Co., 434 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978); McGuire
v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Lamarca v. Miami Herald Publishing
Co., 395 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1975). For an analytical
review of the newspaper cases see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 729.7a-729.7i
(1982 Supp.).
9. See Austin, supra note 7, at 644. The author states:
Firms in a natural monopoly can compete for dominance, in which case only one
will survive, or endeavor to co-exist, with the same result but after a longer period
of time. Since wasteful drainage of resources is likely to be greater, and perform-
ance lower, co-existence is less preferred than a quick struggle to win the monopoly.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976) (electricity); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 n.8 (1974) (electricity); Gulf States Util. Co.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973) (electricity); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973) (electricity); FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S.
86, 92 (1953) (international communication lines); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106
(1948) (small town movie theater); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d
19841
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tent. Nevertheless, some guidance is provided in case law, and therefore,
an analysis of the relevant decisions follows. An analytical framework is
provided to evaluate those contexts where the natural monopoly defense is
an issue. Based upon this analysis, this article concludes that natural
monopolists should not receive complete immunity from the provisions of
section two. If a natural monopolist engages in seriously anticompetitive
practices" which contribute significantly to its monopoly position, that
monopolist should be subject to liability under the Sherman Act.
1030, 1055 (9th Cir. 1983) (military aircraft); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston,
700 F.2d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 1983) (cable television); MCI Communications, Inc. v. American
Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir.) (local telephone services), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 234 (1983); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 745 n.7
(8th Cir. 1982) (shopping mall); Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (cable television); Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder,
660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th Cir. 1981) (cable television); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d
982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (professional football); Greenville Publishing Co., Inc. v. Daily Reflec-
tor, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 1974) (newspapers); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (natural gas); Homefinders of Am., Inc.,
v. Providence Journal Co., 471 F. Supp. 416, 424-25 (D.R.I. 1979) (apartment rental service);
Structure Probe, Inc. v. Franklin Inst., 450 F. Supp. 1272, 1286 (E.D. Penn. 1978) (scanning
electron microscope services); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 511 (E.D. Penn. 1972) (professional hockey).
11. Activities which are "predatory" or "anticompetitive" may cover a broad spectrum of
behavior. As one authority notes, "predatory conduct, though seldom obvious and usually
difficult to identify with certainty, does indeed occur." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST 110 (1977). Still, predatory conduct bears certain distinguishing characteristics.
First, to the educated observer the conduct will appear "abnormal" or at odds with normal
business behavior. Id. at 111-12. In addition the behavior typically has a specific target, a
specific competitor, or group of competitors. Id. at 112. Beyond these two features,
anticompetitive conduct falls along a continuum, from obviously illegal acts involving physical
threats or violence, to practices involving pricing or advertising of products where illegality
becomes difficult to discern. Id. at 112-13.
In addition to "predatory practices" such as refusals to deal or tying arrangements, com-
petitors may also engage in "dirty tricks," activities that may appear unethical but which are
not enough to create a violation of the antitrust laws. For example, in Byars v. Bluff City
News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979), the defendant was accused of covering up the plain-
tiff's magazines with his own magazines on newsstands. In Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc.,
548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), the defendant "puffed" its circulation figures during audits to
discourage rivals.
Although neither exhaustive nor complete, the following cases illustrate practices which the
courts have found anticompetitive: Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)
(refusal to wheel electricity); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953) (tying agreements); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (refusal
to deal); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir, 1983) (division
of markets); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982)
(frivolous litigation); Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984) (resale price maintenance); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co.
v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (predatory pricing); City of
Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980) (price squeezing); Sargent-
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I. BACKGROUND
In United States v. Grinnell Corp.," Justice Douglas stated that two
elements were required for proof of a charge of unlawful monopolization
under section two:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the
wilfull acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of superior product, business
acumen, or historical accident."
The first element, possession of monopoly power, consists of "the power
to control prices or exclude competition."' 4 Under the second element, if
the defendant takes actions which serve to maintain or expand monopoly
power, these actions may violate the Sherman Act. Thus, a violation may
occur even though the monopoly position was originally acquired in a lawful
fashion.'I
Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977) (resale price maintenance),
cert. denied, 439 U.S 822 (1978); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1970) (unlawful tying); United States v. International Fur Workers Union,
100 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1938) (threats of violence), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 653 (1939); United
States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1915) (predatory expenditures), appeal
dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921).
12. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
13. Id. at 570-71. It should be noted that in the natural monopoly market, evidence of
specific intent cannot be used to prove a violation of § 2. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers
of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd as modified, 284 F.2d 582
(1st Cir. 1960).
14. 384 U.S. at 571 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 35i U.S.
377, 391 (1956)).
15. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). In United Shoe, the defendant was the largest supplier
of shoe manufacturing equipment in the United States, supplying more than 75% of the demand
for shoe machinery. 110 F. Supp. at 297. The court acknowledged that the monopoly had
been lawfully acquired noting that, "[p]robably few monopolies could produce a record so
free from any taint of . . . wrongdoing." Id. at 345. Still the court ordered the defendant
to modify its leasing program and to make its machines available for sale to customers. Id.
at 352-54. Even though control of the market was lawfully acquired, "United is denied the
right to exercise effective control of the market by business policies that are not the inevitable
consequences of its capacities or its natural advantages." Id. at 345.
Despite this admonition to monopolists by the court in United Shoe, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit acknowledged that lawful monopolists could engage in the same prac-
tices as other competitors. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). One of the primary issues in the Berkey case
was Kodak's failure to predisclose the release of its 110 format cameras and films to its com-
petitors. 603 F.2d at 279. At the trial the judge instructed the jury that if Kodak held a monopoly
in cameras or film and failed to predisclose its new products, then Kodak's failure to predisclose
its new products constituted exclusionary conduct. Id. at 281. The appellate court concluded
that this instruction was erroneous, stating that:
[Wlithholding from others advance knowledge of one's new products, therefore,
19841
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Applying these two elements to a natural monopoly market poses several
difficulties. The natural monopolist possesses monopoly power in the market
and yet, by definition, the relevant market is capable of supporting only
one supplier. 6 Imposing liability upon a competitor who holds that power
seems particularly unjust, because attaining that position could not be avoided
due to the natural economic forces.
Under an extreme interpretation of Grinnell's second element of unlawful
monopolization, mere possession of monopoly power may be considered a
violation of the antitrust laws.' 7 For the natural monopolist, such a strict
interpretation should not apply because the monopoly is the inevitable result
ordinarily constitutes valid competitive conduct. . . . [A]ny success that [the
monopolist] may achieve through "the process of invention and innovation" is clearly
tolerated by the antitrust laws.
Id. at 281 (quoting United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344). The court continued, noting that a
firm, even a monopolistic firm, which designs a new camera, has the right to the "lead time
that follows from its success." Id. at 283. Thus, the Berkey court indicated .that even monopolists
can engage in aggressive competition like any other competitor.
Other cases have noted, however, that a monopolist's practices will be scrutinized more
strictly than those of an ordinary competitor. See, e.g., Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp.
193 (W.D. Wash. 1966) (defendant exceeded rights of patent monopoly by unreasonably sup-
pressing competition); Laithram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9, amended, 245 F.
Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965) (defendant abused patent monopoly and unjustifiably injured
competition). But see LaSalle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, 445 F.2d 84,
95 (7th Cir. 1971) (patentee can negotiate royalties with the leverage of his monopoly grant
of a patent); Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., 438 F.2d 733, 738 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 922 (1971) (different royalties not unlawful if rational basis for difference exists).
16. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 621. The relevant market can be
defined through reference to the geographic area served by the producer, the number of
similar products in the market, and the ability of others to produce similar products. Id.
1 517; see 1982 Justice Dept. Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11
4502.10, 4502.30 (June 14, 1982). Defining a relevant product market can pose difficulties in
that a determination of substitute products is necessary. See United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
Defining a geographic market is usually an easier process. Generally, one can look to whether
a firm sells locally, regionally, nationally, or internationally and also to transportation costs
for the product. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-62 (1963):
II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 522 (1978).
In litigation arising under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1982), the Supreme Court
provides a very non-analytical approach to the issue of market definition. The Clayton Act,
in general, was intended to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by pre-
serving a large number of small businesses. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 275 (1966). In United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966), Justice Black
suggested that in a § 7 case, no meaningful geographic market need be established by the govern-
ment. Id. at 549. The Justice Department in its 1982 Merger Guidelines attempted to correct
this broadly sweeping definition. 1982 Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, 2 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 4502.30 (June 14, 1982).
Still, in § 2 cases the relevant geographic market would appear to involve the places where
the allegedly monopolized trade occurs. 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 762 (Sept. 20, 1982).
17. This sentiment was stated by Justice Douglas in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948). In Griffith, Justice Douglas wrote:
[M]onopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute
[Vol. 33:465
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of market forces. In the instance of natural monopoly, even clear indica-
tions of intent to monopolize are merely consistent with the decision to enter
a natural monopoly market.
Monopolists in true natural monopoly markets, therefore, must obtain some
relief from possible antitrust liability.'" Control of the natural monopoly
market, however, must be distinguished from the methods used to obtain
the natural monopoly. If the monopolist engages in egregious predatory
conduct, 9 liability should attach. A review of the case law follows and
demonstrates that a competitor in a natural monopoly market may not use
seriously anticompetitive means to achieve or maintain its natural monopoly
status.
A. Non-Regulated Industries
An analysis of natural monopoly markets must begin with a review of
the early case law considering this issue. Two cases, United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)20 and Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers
of New England, Inc.,2" illustrate early judicial efforts to address the issue
of natural monopoly.
In Alcoa, Justice Hand set forth his conclusions regarding situations where
monopoly power should not result in violations of the antitrust laws. Justice
Hand discussed the possibility of unavoidable monopolies, 22 recognizing that
an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised. For
§ 2 of the Act is aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition or retention of effective market
control. .... Hence the existence of power "to exclude competition when it is desired
to do so" is itself a violation of § 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or
intent to exercise that power.
Id. at 107 (citations and footnote omitted). Justice Douglas's interpretation of unlawful monop-
olization appears to be one of the most extreme, condemning monopoly power in and of itself.
18. Defenses to charges of monopolization are limited primarily to the following situations:(1) where the defendant has shown that it does not have a monopoly in the relevant market,
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); (2) where the defendant
can demonstrate that it acquired the monopoly in a lawful fashion, United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1.945) (dicta); (3) where the competitive benefits
of the defendant's actions outweigh the anticompetitive effects, Broadcast Music v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); or (4) where the monopolist has a legitimate businessjustification for extending its monopoly, Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692 (8th
Cir. 1984).
19. See supra note 11.
20. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
21. 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd as modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960).
22. See 148 F.2d at 429. Hand recognized a variety of situations where monopoly power
could not be condemned per se. Specifically, Hand noted situations where a market could be
so limited that only one supplier could produce and still meet the costs of production, where
changes in tastes or costs could drive all but one producer out of the market, and where a
competitor may be the only survivor in a market by virtue of his skill, foresight, and industry.
Id. at 430. Hand categorized all of these as monopolies which were "thrust upon" the com-
petitor. Id. at 429.
1984]
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a natural monopoly fell within this class.23 He wrote that "[a] market may
...be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the costs
of production except by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand.'" 4
Thus, Justice Hand established the principle that, in some instances, posses-
sion of a monopoly should not be considered a violation of the Sherman Act.
In Union Leader,2" the court faced the task of applying section two to
a market which it believed to be a natural monopoly.2 6 The case involved
a small Massachusetts town which had been served by a single newspaper
for almost a century.27 When the printers of the the Haverhill Gazette
newspaper went on strike, the Union Leader, a publisher from a nearby
town, published a shoppers' guide for the town of Haverhill. 2 Later the
Union Leader began to publish and distribute its paper in Haverhill on a
regular basis. 9 Union Leader filed suit against the Gazette alleging that the
defendant had engaged in a variety of unfair practices in seeking to main-
tain its monopoly power in Haverhill.3 ° The Gazette filed a counterclaim
against Union Leader, alleging violations of sections one and two of the
Sherman Act.3
The district court noted that the town of Haverhill was a "one newspaper
city," 3 and that the market could not support two high quality daily
newspapers. 3 In analyzing the Gazette's section two claim against Union
Leader, the court clearly recognized that the intent to capture the market
through skill, foresight, and industry would not be a violation of section
Subsequent decisions appear to have added five more circumstances where a monopoly may
be thrust upon a competitor: (1) new discovery; (2) original entry into a field; (3) accessibility
to raw materials and skilled labor; (4) permanent, nondiscriminatory low profit margins; and
(5) licenses conferred by and used within the law, for example, by patents and copyrights.
See Strickland, The Thrust Upon Defense to Monopoly Prosecution in Alaska, 9 U.C.L.A.
[UCLA-AtsKA L. REv. 87, 88 (1979).
23. 148 F.2d at 430. Hand did not specifically refer to a natural monopoly although the
concept is implicit in his opinion.
24. Id.
25. 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd as modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960).
26. 180 F. Supp. at 129. See generally Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper
Industry, 61 YALE L.J. 948 (1952) (The newspaper industry is one which, over the years, has
tended toward monopoly conditions.).
27. 180 F. Supp. at 129.
28, Id. at 130.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 142-43. Specifically, Union Leader alleged that the Gazette gave secret discriminatory
benefits to some advertisers and lowered their advertising rates in violation of the Sherman
Act. Id.
31. Id. at 140-41. The Gazette challenged the use of the Gazette's striking printers to help
deliver the Haverhill Journal, the Journal's requests to some merchants not to advertise in
the Gazette, and the Journal's secret payments to merchants not to advertise in the Gazette. Id.
32. Id. at 129.
33. Id.
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two. 4 Exclusionary intent, however, could be proven through evidence of
the use of unfair means to gain control in the natural monopoly market.3"
In the opinion of the court, the "unfair means" employed by Union Leader
included secret payments to Haverhill businessmen", and discriminatory adver-
tising rates.3 The court found that these two acts were prima facie evidence
of exclusionary intent, practices "not honestly industrial," 3 and thus, con-
stituted an attempt to monopolize. 39
The court applied the same test of unfair means to the behavior of the
defendant Gazette. The Gazette secretly lowered its advertising rates in order
to compete with Union Leader's rates. Although the defendant contended
that this action was taken in self-defense, the court rejected this argument.'*
According to the court, the Gazette's behavior also was "not honestly
industrial,"'1  and thus constituted an attempt to monopolize the market in
violation of section two.
4 1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit acknowledged that
the newspaper market in Haverhill could support only one publication.' 3 The
court took a different approach, however, with respect to the charges of
attempted monopolization. The court agreed that Union Leader's secret
payments to Haverhill businessmen were conclusive evidence of an exclu-
sionary intent and thus, a violation of section two." Based upon this con-
clusion, the court found it unnecessary to discuss or decide whether Union
Leader's discriminatory advertising rates demonstrated an exclusionary
intent.'3
The appellate court then reversed the district court's finding that the Gazette
had also violated section two." Although the Gazette did engage in
34. Id. at 140. Judge Wyzanski concluded that,
[a] person does not necessarily have an exclusionary intent merely because he foresees
that a market is only large enough to permit one successful enterprise, and intends
that his enterprise shall be that one and that all other enterprises shall fail. If the
evidence shows that in laying his plans and executing them he contemplates and
utilizes only superior skill, foresight, and industry, he has not an intent which is
contrary to law.
Id. This finding is similar to Judge Hand's discussion of natural monopolies in Alcoa. See
supra note 22.
35. 180 F. Supp. at 140.
36. Id. at 140-41.
37. Id. at 141.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 142.
40. Id. at 142-43.
41. Id. at 143.
42. Id.
43. 248 F.2d at 583-84.
44. Id. at 585.
45. Id. at 586.
46. Id. at 587.
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discriminatory practices with regard to advertising rates, the court found that
these actions were taken in self-defense."7 The court wrote that "[t]o the
extent that a party has merely sought to offset the other's illegal acts it
has not acted with a wrongful intention. '4 8 The court noted that the existence
of a natural monopoly market did not alter the Gazette's right to defend
itself.'9 Defensive actions, such as those taken by the Gazette, did not
demonstrate the exclusionary intent necessary to prove a violation of section
two.10
Thus, in the appellate court's view, the only activity which clearly fell
within the definition of "unfair means" was Union Leader's secret payments
to local businessmen.' Regarding Union Leader, the lower court found selec-
tive price reduction to be an unfair practice. The appellate court, however,
never reached the issue. In the case of the Gazette, the court found that
selective price reduction was not an unfair practice. Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the district court's finding with respect to the Union Leader, but
reversed the lower court's finding in regard to the Gazette.
Whether Union Leader's discriminatory advertising rates alone would have
been an unfair practice remains unclear. The concern lies in the possibility
that these low rates would constitute below cost or predatory pricing." Below
cost pricing, however, could be justified as a promotional price, used to
attract customers for a short period of time." Union Leader provides little
guidance for the competitor attempting to determine what pricing activities
will be permitted in an elimination bout in a natural monopoly market.
Both Alcoa and Union Leader provide examples of early judicial efforts
to deal with natural monopolies in antitrust litigation. It would appear that
judicial intuition is the primary analytical tool for evaluating natural
monopolies in unregulated industries. Therefore, little guidance is provided
for future cases involving natural monopolies because of the judiciary's failure
to provide a consistent analytical framework to evaluate natural monopoly
markets.
Natural monopolies arise in situations where a small town is capable of
supporting only one enterprise of a particular type. Natural monopolies also
exist in situations which involve the distribution of utility services, such as
electricity or local telephone service."' The classic governmental response to
47. Id.
48. Id. at 586-87.
49. Id. at 587.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 585.
52. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 1 214 (3d ed. 1981).
53. Id. 1 214, at 200. If the promotional price results in increasing demand, thus calling
forth increased production, the average cost will, by definition, fall in a natural monopoly
industry. Thus a promotional price which may be below average cost at one point in time
may be above average cost if production is increased.
54. Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 4, at 284.
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these natural monopolies has been to impose regulation to control the
monopolist." A review of cases concerning regulated natural monopolies sheds
further light on the courts' analysis of the natural monopoly defense.
B. Regulated Industries
For many years, monopolists subject to the regulatory controls of state
or federal agencies assumed that they were exempt from the antitrust laws.
In the 1973 case of Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 56 the United
States Supreme Court addressed this issue. The Court held that regulated
industries were subject to possible liability under the Sherman Act.
In Otter Tail, the defendant utility company faced charges of violating
section two for allegedly monopolizing the retail market for distribution of
electrical power in the service area.57 At the district court level, the power
company argued that it was exempt from antitrust liability since its acts were
taken in self-defense." Nonetheless, the district court found Otter Tail guil-
ty of violating the antitrust laws and enjoined future refusals to sell or wheel
power 9 in the service area.60
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Otter Tail raised the
defense that it was exempt from antitrust liability because it was regulated' 1
The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting the strong presumption
against an exemption from the antitrust laws absent a "plain repugnancy"
between the regulatory scheme and the antitrust laws.62 The majority af-
firmed the district court's ruling that Otter Tail's behavior constituted an
attempt to monopolize. 3 Thus, despite Otter Tail's assertions that it was
not subject to antitrust scrutiny due to its regulation, the Supreme Court
held that Otter Tail had violated section two of the Sherman Act.
55. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982).
56. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). The district court opinion in Otter Tail can be found at 331 F.
Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971). A related opinion, regarding a motion to amend the pleadings,
appears at 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973).
57. Otter Tail, 331 F. Supp. at 56.
58. Id. at 58.
59. Wheeling power was defined by the court as "[transporting] power for another supplier."
Id. at 56 n.l.
60. Id. at 65.
61. 410 U.S. at 372. Otter Tail argued that because the Federal Power Commission had
the authority to order involuntary interconnections pursuant to § 202(b) of the Federal Power
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1982), Otter Tail should be immune from antitrust prosecution.
This argument was not addressed in the district court's written opinion.
62. 410 U.S. at 373-74. The Court noted that the legislative history of the Federal Power
Act suggested a preference for voluntary interconnections and a policy which encouraged com-
petition. Id.
63. Id. at 372. Specifically, the district court had found that Otter Tail refused to sell wholesale
power to proposed municipal systems in communities where it currently sold retail power, refused
to wheel power to proposed municipal systems, brought sham litigation in an effort to block
the construction of proposed municipal systems, and used its transmission contract provisions
to deny the proposed municipal systems access to other suppliers. Id. at 368.
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Although the majority favored application of the antitrust laws, three
Justices dissented."' The natural monopoly characteristics of power distribu-
tion and the economies of scale possible from large scale power operations
had originally created the need for the imposition of a federal regulatory
scheme .6 Thus, the dissent argued that the federal regulatory scheme and
the industry structure precluded the application of the antitrust laws to the
defendant." Although the minority focused on the nature of the regulatory
scheme, natural monopoly analysis and the implication that these monopolies
should not be subject to traditional antitrust enforcement were implicit
throughout the minority opinion.'.
Subsequent decisions have not disturbed the holding of Otter Tail.6" Despite
heavy regulatory controls and natural monopoly conditions in some industries,
the Court appears dedicated to the position that competition must be en-
couraged in regulated markets, and that absent a clear exemption from the
antitrust laws, practices which are plainly anticompetitive will not be tolerated
regardless of industry structure.'9 A review of current antitrust litigation ap-
pears to support this view, although the approaches followed by the courts
do not follow a uniform path.
64. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the partial dissent of Justice Stewart.
Id. at 382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority had "mechanically
applied" the Sherman Act and in the process had misconstrued the legislative purpose of the
Federal Power Act. Id. at 383 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent went so far as to state
that the decree of the Court "starkly conflict[s] with the explicit statutory mandate of the Federal
Power Commission." Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
65. The dissent argued that the antitrust laws were simply inapplicable in this context, because
"[a]ntitrust principles applicable to other industries cannot be blindly applied to a unilateral
refusal to deal on the part of a power company, operating in a regime of rate regulation and
licensed monopolies." Id. at 389 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 383-84 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent stated at the outset that Otter Tail operated
in a "natural-monopoly industry" and made explicit reference to this fact throughout the opinion.
68. See Gulf States Util. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973) (the Federal
Power Act did not render antitrust policy irrelevant to the electric power industry); City of
Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1980) (unlawful to
charge municipalities more money than other consumers), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981);
Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1351-52 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (antitrust
action stayed pending federal agency decision on rates). Earlier decisions had indicated that
utilities would indeed escape antitrust liability. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sherman Act does not apply to monopolies
in the public interest such as gas and electricity which are under state regulation); Pennsylvania
Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 193 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (antitrust
law has limited application to regulated industry), aff'd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952).
69. 410 U.S. at 372. Otter Tail's actions to monopolize distribution in the service area were
extensive and included the commencement of litigation in four of the towns in the service area,
thus preventing the towns from issuing bonds to finance the municipal facilities.
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II. CURRENT TRENDS AND CASES
In the recent "third wave"7 0 of antitrust litigation, more sophisticated
economic tools are being used to evaluate the business practices of defen-
dants charged with antitrust violations." Placing primary emphasis on the
70. See Flynn, Monopolization Under the Sherman Act: The Third Wave and Beyond, 26
ANTTRUST BULL. 1 (1981). The author characterizes antitrust litigation as falling into three
categories or "waves" as follows: (1) beginning with Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 (1904), and ending with United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417 (1920); (2) beginning in the late thirties when Alcoa was filed and ending in the early
fifties with United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); and (3) beginning in the late sixties with the filing
of the IBM case, United States v. IBM Corp., 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,070 (filed S.D.N.Y.
1969), and continuing to the present.
The "first wave" began 20 years after the enactment of the Sherman Act legislation, focus-
ing on corporate giants in the railroad and oil industries. Flynn, supra, at 4. The "second
wave" of litigation developed after the Great Depression when the country considered the
possibility of cartelization to help the recovery of the economy. Id. at 9. "Wave three" involves
the increased use of economics and an increasing number of private actions enforcing § 2.
Id. at 22.
71. Economic analysis has had the greatest impact in the area of predatory pricing. In 1975,
Professor Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner published an article setting forth a cost-based
approach to analyzing pricing behavior. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HA~v. L. REV. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Predatory Pricing]. Under the Areeda and Turner model, any price below average variable
cost (AVC) is resumed to be predatory. Id. at 732-33. Conversely, prices at or above average
total cost (ATC) are presumptively nonpredatory. Id.
The Areeda and Turner article sparked a great deal of comment and criticism within the academic
community. For a history of the debate, the following are listed in chronological order: Scherer,
Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1976); Areeda
& Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HAsv. L. REV. 891 (1976); Scherer,
Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARv. L. REv. 901 (1976); Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Areeda & Turner, Williamson
on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 (1979); Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing
II, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979); Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reduction: A Policy for
Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979); Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework
for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979); see also Posner,
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 939-44 (1979).
In addition, the article spurred a great deal of judicial interest. The AVC rule received early
judicial recognition in the Fifth Circuit in the case of International Air Indus., Inc. v. American
Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). Although the
court did not directly apply the Areeda and Turner rule, economic analysis comprised a substantial
portion of the court's analytical framework.
When the AVC rule first appeared, the Ninth Circuit readily applied it to antitrust cases
involving predatory conduct. See, e.g., Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). Later, as scholarly criticism began to emerge,
the Ninth Circuit backed away from its original acceptance of the rule. This retraction was
also due, in part, to California district court decisions which refused to follow the AVC rule.
See, e.g., Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980); Transamerican
Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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goal of economic efficiency,"2 the courts have turned to economic analysis
for guidance in making their decisions in antitrust litigation." This new
analytical approach, however, has not provided clear answers to the issues
of how natural monopoly markets should be identified and what conduct
will be tolerated in those markets.
The problem of market definition is evident in the 1983 case of Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. City of Houston.74 Affliated Capital involved the award
of cable television franchises in the city of Houston, Texas. The city awarded
franchises to four companies, who had previously agreed to a territorial divi-
sion of service areas within the city. When the plaintiff submitted an
application for a franchise, it was informed that it was too late, since the
The final blow to the AVC rule in the Ninth Circuit came in the case of William Inglis
& Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (amended
order 1982). In Inglis, the plaintiffs had charged violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act and
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The case involved competition in the wholesale bread market
in northern California. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had engaged in predatory pricing
behavior for over three years, which eventually forced the plaintiffs out of business. Although
the Inglis court retained the Areeda and Turner below-AVC standard, the court expressly rejected
any presumption that prices at or above AVC were merit-based. Id. at 1035-36.
The Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have also considered the Areeda
and Turner AVC rule. No clear pattern has emerged from these decisions. Some courts are
willing to embrace a cost-based approach while others find it instructive but not determinative.
Compare Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1981); Northeastern Tel.
Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1438 (1981)
(both cases adopting the AVC rule) with 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 349-50
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1771 (1981); Chillacothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980); Pacific Eng. & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551
F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (in all cases
the AVC rule was instructive but not determinative). Clearly, as economic tools develop they
will play an increasingly important role in antitrust analysis.
72. A continuing conflict exists regarding the legislative intent surrounding the Sherman
Act. While the prevailing view is that Congress intended courts to consider non-economic fac-
tors, some scholars argue that economic concerns played a primary role in the enactment of
the Sherman legislation. Compare H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLicY (1955); Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Original & Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpreta-
tion Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (dominant views) with R. BoRK, THm ANTITRUST
PARAnOs (1978); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON.
7 (1966) (legislative intent indicates courts should look only to consumer welfare and economic
criteria). Within the dominant viewpoint, there are two noneconomic schools of thought, the
societal and the structuralist. See Austin, The Emergence of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U. L.
RaV. 903, 904-05 (1972) (societal view); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competi-
tion and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977) (structuralist analysis).
Although the societal school clearly occupies the more extreme position, both the societal and
structuralist approaches stress the importance of noneconomic factors in antitrust analysis.
73. See Flynn, supra note 70, at 22; see also Flynn, Old Wine in New Bottles: Some Obser-
vations about Current Monopoliziation Litigation, 13 U. ToL. L. Ry. 499, 502-03 (1982) (courts
are turning towards economic analysis in antitrust litigation).
74. 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983).
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"pie had been cut.''"
The plaintiff brought an antitrust action, alleging that the agreement to
divide the city of Houston into exclusive service areas constituted a viola-
tion of section one of the Sherman Act.7 The defendant argued that the
market for cable television in Houston constituted a natural monopoly.7"
According to the defendant, the natural monopoly conditions precluded com-
petition within the franchise areas, and thus, the agreement to divide the
franchise areas caused no harm." Although the court rejected the validity
of the agreement, it accepted without question the characterization of the
market as a natural monopoly." The court simply stated: "We assume for
purposes of this discussion that cable television is indeed a natural monopoly
and proceed to discuss the pernicious affects [sic] of the conspiracy given
this fact."8 0 Thus, the court did not analyze the cable market to determine
if it was in fact a natural monopoly market. This failure to construct a
clear market definition in markets that have been traditionally viewed as
natural monopolies can lead to the mischaracterization of a market."1
75. Id. at 229. The cable controversy in Houston began in 1972 when the city first solicited
applications for cable franchises. The public service and legal departments had recommended
two applicants to the City Council, which in turn selected one of the applicants. Id. at 227.
The unsuccessful applicant circulated a petition and obtained enough signatures to place the
issue on a referendum ballot. Houston's voters defeated the award of a monopoly franchise.
Id. at 227-28.
In 1978, the issue surfaced again. Rather than actively soliciting bids, however, the city passively
accepted bids from interested cable companies. The final division of the cable market by four
competitors culminated in this litigation. Id. at 228-29.
76. Id. at 230. Section one provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal ...
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
The plaintiff's complaint involved only violations of § I of the Sherman Act because the
defendants agreed to divide the market in Houston. Nevertheless, one of the defendants asserted
that because the market was a natural monopoly, the plaintiffs could not have suffered harm
from the market allocations. 700 F.2d at 234. The district court granted the defendant a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, denying the plaintiff the jury's award of $2.1 million. The
appellate court reversed, reinstating the jury's award. Id. at 227.
77. 700 F.2d at 234. The court noted that,
[diefendant Gulf Coast asserts that cable television, like the electric utility, is generally
considered a natural monopoly. According to the common wisdom, the extremely
high fixed costs incurred in preparing a cable television company for operation pre-
vent the survival of competition in the marketplace.
Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The court noted that the fact of a natural monopoly market made the defendant's
conduct all the more devastating. No competition could effectively take place once the fran-
chise was awarded. Thus, the only competition possible occured during the period before the
franchise was granted. Id.
81. Cable television provides an excellent example of a market that has been mischaracterized
as a natural monopoly. See Hamilton, Implications for Economic Regulation of Cable Televi-
sion, 10 WM. MrrcHBLL L. REv. 433 (1984).
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Further, the case law often fails to provide clear standards of behavior
for firms in natural monopoly markets. Two recent newspaper cases
demonstrate this omission in the antitrust case law. In Byars v. Bluff City
News Co."2 and Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co.,83 the courts considered
cases where monopolists attempted to vertically integrate their production
monopolies 14 into the distribution level of the industry.
In Byars, the owner of the Bluff City News (News) decided that its existing
newspaper distribution system was undesirable.8" The company decided to
replace Byars, an independent carrier, with its own distribution agents.86 As
a result of its decision, the News refused to continue dealing with Byars.
Byars brought an action alleging that the News's refusal to deal with it con-
stituted an illegal monopolization of the relevant market. 7 The facts indicated
that the monopoly had been "thrust upon" the News by national
distributors" and that the industry possessed some features of a natural
monopoly. 9
In addition to refusing to deal with Byars, the News allegedly engaged
in a variety of other acts after Byars secured other smaller accounts which
the appellate court termed "dirty tricks." 9 These alleged acts ranged from
removing the plaintiffs' magazine racks to threats of reprisal against
individuals who could have helped the plaintiff obtain alternative sources
of periodicals. 9'
82. 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd after remand, 683 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1982).
83. 441 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated and remanded, 605 F.2d 403 (8th Cir.
1979), aff'd on rehearing, 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982) (panel opinion), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692
(8th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
84. Vertical integration occurs when a single firm is involved in two or more stages of
the production and distribution of a single end product. III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
notes 2, 723. This is to be compared to horizontal integration. Horizontal integration occurs
when a producer attempts to acquire a competitor in order to create a monopoly. Id.
85. 609 F.2d at 848.
86. Id. at 847-48. Andrew Byars had worked as a distributor of Bluff City News since
1957. In 1970, the new owners of the company were unhappy with the arrangement with Byars
and terminated it. Id.
87. Id. at 846.
88. Id. at 853. The record indicated that the national periodical distributors, for valid business
reasons, chose to deal only with Bluff City. Thus, Bluff City had obtained a monopoly. As
Hand established in Alcoa, mere possession of monopoly power is not contrary to the Sherman
Act, Monopoly power which is obtained because of a superior product, acute business sense,
or circumstance should not be faulted. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
89. 609 F.2d at 851-52. As the court pointed out, periodicals are highly perishable. Regional
distributors are unwilling to bear the risk of purchasing large quantities of magazines that can
become outdated quickly. Thus, unsold periodicals can be returned to national distributors
by regional distributors. Generally, to avoid confusion and minimize problems, national dealers
have made the decision not to have more than one regional distributor in any given area. Id.
at 852.
90. Id. at 853-54.
91. Id. at 854 n.30.
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The appellate court found that on the basis of the evidence, the trial court
had failed to determine whether the News held a monopoly.'" If additional
fact finding resulted in a finding that the News held a monopoly, the
"[piredatory conduct on Bluff City's part would go a long way toward
establishing a [section two] violation."' 93 In referring to the predatory con-
duct, the court specifically mentioned the defendant's alleged misconduct.' 4
The case was thus remanded to the trial court.. for additional fact finding.
The case returned to the appellate court three years later. 5 The appellate
court noted that the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing but simply
allowed the parties to supplement the record.' 6 Further, the trial court held
that although the News did have monopoly power,' 7 no abuse of that power
occurred.'8 The Sixth Circuit affirmed this holding with reluctance, stating
that "[tihere is little doubt that this Court may well have come to a dif-
ferent conclusion had we viewed de novo the evidence on the present
record."" Thus, whether all of the News's alleged "dirty tricks" were actually
tolerable practices remains unclear.
Following the final decision in Byars, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced a situation similar to Byars. In Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co.,"'
the defendant (Star) held a monopoly of its wholesale newspaper market
in Kansas City, Missouri."' The Star used independent carriers to deliver
its newspapers, although the Star retained the right to distribute the papers
itself. 102
When the Star proposed a discontinuation of its independent delivery
system, the plaintiff and 250 other independent newspaper carriers filed an
antitrust action alleging violations of section two of the Sherman Act for
refusal to deal and attempted monopolization of the carrier market.0 3 The
district court granted an injunction preventing the termination of the
92. Id. at 852-53. The appellate court ordered fresh fact-finding on the issue of whether
the News possessed the power to control prices or exclude competition. Id.
93. Id. at 863 (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1973)).
94. Id. at 863.
95. 683 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 982.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 983. The trial court heard conflicting evidence from News's employees regarding
the alleged "dirty tricks." The content of this testimony is not included in the appellate court
decision. The appellate court stated only that "[t]he Court concluded that Bluff City's conduct
was fair competition." Id.
99. Id.
100. 441 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated and remanded, 605 F.2d 403 (8th Cir.
1979), aff'd on rehearing, 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982) (panel opinion), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692
(8th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
101. 695 F.2d at 326-27.
102. Id. at 325.
103. Id.
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independent carrier contracts'14 and awarded the plaintiffs' attorney fees.' 0 '
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court.'
0 6
Upon the newspaper's petition, the Eighth Circuit agreed to reconsider
the case en banc."°" The court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the holding of
the panel decision.' 0 ' In an opinion that placed great emphasis on economic
theory and analysis,'0 9 the majority found that the Star's decision to ver-
tically integrate did not violate section two of the Sherman Act." '
Using the optimum monopoly price theory of the Chicago School of
Economics,"' the court concluded that the Star's decision to vertically
integrate would not have unreasonable anticompetitive effects and, in fact,
would result in lower prices and better service for some customers." 2 The
dissent, however, took a dim view of this interpretation of the evidence,
stating that they preferred to rely on facts rather than theory."' Further,
the dissent pointed out that the Star had originally obtained its monopoly
status in an illegal fashion,'"4 that many more customers would see price
increases rather than decreases,"' and that many customers would suffer
104. Id. at 335.
105. Id. at 339.
106. 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982).
107. 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984).
108. Id. at 704.
109. Id. at 699-701. The court reviewed both the potential competitor theory and the optimum
monopoly theory in arriving at its decision.
110. Id. at 704.
Ill. Id. at 705. The court summarized the optimum monopoly price theory as follows:
Under any given set of cost and demand curves for a product, there is one price
at which a monopolist can maximize its profits. This price is determined by com-
puting the quantity of product that is produced at the point where the monopolist's
costs in making one more item (marginal cost) equals the revenue from selling that
additional item (marginal revenue). The price at which the public will buy all of
that quantity, but no more (demand curve), will be the optimum monopoly price.
If the monopolist charges more than this price, its profits will decline because the
lost revenues from the reduced number of sales would more than offset the added
revenue from the higher price. If the monopolist charges less, the added revenue
from increased sales will not compensate for the reduced revenue per sale and the
added marginal costs in producing that quantity. Thus the monopolist's profit will
be less than at the optimum monopoly price.
Id. at 701 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 703-04.
113. Id. at 706 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 704 (Heaney, J., dissenting). In 1955 the Star was convicted of violating § 2
of the Sherman Act for actual and attempted monopolization. Kansas City Star Co. v. United
States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957). The conviction was based on the Star's anticompetitive
behavior in driving competitors out of the market and not allowing others to enter the Kansas
City market. The charges of attempted and actual monopolization were merged, resulting in
a single fine of five thousand dollars being assessed against the Star. Id. at 648. On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury conviction, holding that there was substan-
tial evidence upon which it could have been found that the Star used its dominant position
to drive competitors out of the market and to keep others from entering the market. Id. at 654-57.
115. 727 F.2d at 705 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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reduced services.11 6 Finally, taking a populist approach to antitrust analysis,
the dissent noted the desirability of preserving 250 independent businesses." 7
Paschall indicates that courts may look to economic theory to predict
whether conduct may have unreasonable anticompetitive effects, such as
higher prices or reduced services, in determining whether a section two viola-
tion has occurred. Looking to predictable effects rather than the means used
to achieve those effects may be particularly useful in the natural monopoly
setting, where the nature of the market itself makes evidence of "specific
intent" such as statements of intent to monopolize or below-cost pricing,
inconclusive. Focusing only on effects, however, provides little guidance for
the competitor attempting to discern what actions will not violate the Sher-
man Act.
Affiliated Capital, Byars, and Paschall all demonstrate the difficulties faced
in analyzing a natural monopoly market and defense. Courts have not yet
clearly addressed how to determine whether a market is indeed a natural
monopoly market or what particular activities violate the antitrust laws in
such a market. These cases, however, provide a springboard for a more prin-
cipled approach to natural monopoly analysis by exemplifying the problems
inherent in natural monopoly situations.
III. PROBLEMS SUtRROUNDING NATURAL MONOPOLY MARKETS
As Affiliated Capital, Byars, and Paschall demonstrate, the courts have
not clearly analyzed the market definition of a natural monopoly. Further,
upon finding that a market is a natural monopoly, the courts have not applied
an analysis of intent and conduct in a consistent manner. It is clear that
the economic factors at work in a natural monopoly market dictate that
some accommodation be made to preclude strict enforcement of section two.
A principled analysis of these issues must take into account several problems
inherent in the natural monopoly defense.
A. Definition of a Natural Monopoly Market
One of the most difficult issues simply involves identifying those markets
which are, in fact, natural monopolies."' The courts have had difficulty
116. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 706 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELEC-
TRICAL UTIITY DEREGULATION 29-34 (1983). The authors note the extensive scholarly debate
concerning whether vertically integrated electric companies are natural monopolies, or whether
generation and transmission might be competitively priced, leaving electric distribution as the
only true monopoly. Id.; see also R. SCHMALEN EE, supra note 1; Demesetz, Why Regulated
Utilities?, 11 J. L. & ECON. 55 (1968); Goldberg, Deregulation and Administered Contracts,
7 BELL J. EcoN. 426 (1976); Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General
and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976) (all discussing alternative methods of
introducing competition into perceived natural monopoly markets).
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defining these markets and commentators have provided lengthy lists of
"identifying characteristics" of natural monopoly markets which serve to
complicate, rather than clarify, the analysis." ' The soundest approach to
the market definition issue is to start with the goal of current antitrust
analysis: to provide the most efficient use of resources at the lowest cost.2 0
119. See Primeaux, Some Problems With Natural Monopoly, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 63 (1979).
Primeaux lists 11 elements which sometimes characterize natural monopoly:
1. Attributes of natural monopoly dependent on economies of scale for their
existence or implementation.
a. Economies of scale in production characterize a natural monopoly. The
economies result in persistently decreasing long-run average total costs which
means that a firm's costs continue to fall as output is increased.
b. Firms in a natural monopoly are characterized by relatively high fixed costs.
c. A single producer in an industry characterized as a natural monopoly
operates at lower cost than if two or more firms served the market.
d. The nature of the business in a natural monopoly is such that a large
number of competing plants is impossible.
e. Higher customer prices will result if more than one firm serves a market
in an industry characterized as a natural monopoly.
f. Price differences are a customer attraction in a natural monopoly. Small
price differences by one firm cause customers to switch to that firm.
2. Attributes of natural monopoly not dependent on economies of scale for their
existence or implementation.
a. The item supplied by a natural monopoly is a necessity.
b. Duplication of facilities in a natural monopoly causes inconvenience to
customers.
c. Natural monopolies supply articles or conveniences which are used at the
place where produced and in connection with the plant or machinery supplying
the output.
d. Natural monopolies may result from a special limitation of raw materials.
e. Natural monopolies may arise from secrecy.
Id. at 64-65.
Ultimately, Primeaux concludes that none of the attributes usually applied to characterize
natural monopolies is applicable in the electric industry. Thus, he states that any continued
grants of monopoly to electric utilities must rest on something other than a natural monopoly
justification. Id. at 84-85.
See also Austin, supra note 7, at 646. Austin notes that Professor John O'Donnell lists six
characteristics of natural monopoly:
1) high proportion of fixed to variable costs;
2) a product that has to be supplied on demand;
3) an "umbilical" cord to consumers or a permanent connection that can only
be switched at considerable expense;
4) fluctuating demand;
5) use of eminent domain or similar techniques; and
6) necessity of the product.
Id. As stated in the text, these definitions complicate rather than clarify natural monopoly
analysis. Further, reliance on such characteristic lists can result in a mischaracterization of a
market as a natural monopoly. See supra note 81.
120. The evolutionary change in the most recent Supreme Court opinions toward accepting
the notion that economic efficiency is the principal, if not the sole, goal of antitrust enforce-
ment is documented in Sims; 'Monsanto,' 'Hyde' Rulings Put Baxter Slightly Ahead, Legal
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This points toward a simple and workable definition of a natural monopoly.
In economic terms, a monopoly is natural only when one producer provides
the lowest cost method of supply in the long run. '
Despite the apparent simplicity of this definition, in reality its application
to a given market may be difficult. Changing technology may prevent an
accurate characterization of a market as a natural monopoly. Cable televi-
sion systems provide an excellent example of situations where technological
developments have made its characterization as a natural monopoly
obsolete.' Competing technologies with similar services and prices provide
a competitive check on cable systems and prevent them from exercising
apparent monopoly control.'23
While the physical attributes of a cable system may constitute a natural
monopoly in the sense that the duplication of the cable distribution system
would be wasteful, the cable firm may lack market power. Technological
innovations have created a variety of alternatives which provide ample com-
petition for the services provided by a cable system.' 2' Many alternatives
to the services provided by cable systems currently exist' 25 and other alter-
natives will be developed which will provide more competition for cable in
the future.' 26
Thus, in industries where technology is rapidly developing, the definition
of a natural monopoly is particularly problematic. Competitive substitutes
may be quickly developed to eliminate market power. Antitrust policy must
protect these sources of innovation from anticompetitive practices. Conse-
quently, the foreseeability of innovation affecting a given market must be
analyzed by the courts.
Similarly, where a monopolist is regulated, the application of the simple
definition of natural monopoly in the context of a monopolization charge
may be difficult. In particular, the application of traditional market share
analysis to demonstrate monopoly power may lead to incorrect conclusions.
MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,' 27
Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at 14 and Sims & Myers, Baxter Grabs the Brass Ring in 1984 Antitrust
Season, Legal Times, July 23, 1984, at 10.
121. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 3; Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 4, at 284 n.10.
A more technical definition of a natural monopoly can be arrived at through the introduction of
the concept of "subadditivity." See Cirace, supra note 1, at 492. The concept of "subadditivity,"
however, is essentially a reformulation of the definition that a monopoly is natural only when
one producer is the lowest cost method of supply in the long run. Id.
122. See Hamilton, supra note 81, at 456.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 438-39. These include conventional television, subscription television, multi-
point distribution service, and satellite master antenna television.
126. See id. at 439. In the near future, direct broadcast satellites and low power television
stations may be available.
127. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983).
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a recent case involving a regulated utility company possessing natural
monopoly characteristics, points to the need for careful economic analysis
of whether a regulatory scheme may prevent a company from controlling
prices or excluding competitors from the market. If so, the regulated com-
pany would lack the necessary monopoly power for a finding of monopoliza-
tion under the Sherman Act. In MCI, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit noted that heavy reliance on market share data is likely to be a
misleading indicator of "monopoly power" in a regulated setting. 28 Statistical
dominance may be the result of regulation imposing an obligation to serve
the public. In lieu of traditional market share analysis, the appellate court
held that "the analysis [of whether AT&T possesses market power] must
focus directly on the ability of the regulated company to control prices or
exclude competition."' 2 9 Thus, in a case involving a refusal to deal by a
utility having natural monopoly characteristics, the court required direct
evidence of the power to control prices or exclude competitors before it would
find that the requisite monopoly power existed. 3 '
B. Leveraging
The second problem created by natural monopoly markets involves the
use of the monopoly power in the natural monopoly market to gain control
of another market which is not a natural monopoly. 3' The problem is of
particular concern when the natural monopoly market is regulated. Antitrust
actions have challenged this practice of leveraging in the past.' 2
128. 708 F.2d at 1107.
129. Id.; see also Almeda Mall v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343, 354 (5th
Cir.) (in natural monopoly setting, controlling relevant market share cannot lead to the in-
ference of traditional monopoly power), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
130. For criticism of the appellate court's reasoning with respect to whether AT&T had the
ability to control prices or exclude competitors, see Norton & Early, Limitations On the Obliga-
tion to Provide Access to Electric Transmission and Distribution Lines, 5 ENERGY L.J. 47,
61-64 (1984).
131. The concept of leveraging is evident in the 1948 case of United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100 (1948). In Griffith, the defendant owned movie theaters throughout Oklahoma, Texas,
and New Mexico. Id. at 101-02. Many of the theaters operated in "closed towns," that is,
towns capable of supporting only one theater. Id. The defendant attempted to combine the
purchasing power it possessed in the closed towns to obtain exclusive run and first run movies
for its theaters in competitive towns. Despite the fact that the defendant's competitive practices
were generally found to be lawful, the court enjoined future "package negotiations," noting
that any attempts to acquire, retain, or expand monopoly power could be found to violate
§ 2. Id. at 108-09.
132. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (Court did not exempt
a private utility company from liability under the Sherman Act for using its monopoly power
in distribution of electricity to restrain competition in the sale of light bulbs); Times-Picayune
Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) ("tying" agreements in which a seller exploits
his dominant position in one market to expand into another are violative of the Sherman Act);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (operator of a circuit of motion picture theatres
cannot use his monopoly power in towns where he has no competitors to obtain exclusive
rights to films in those towns where he has competitors).
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The 1976 case of Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.' provides an example
of this leveraging technique. The defendant, Detroit Edison, supplied elec-
tricity to about five million customers in southeastern Michigan., 34 In addi-
tion, Detroit Edison supplied customers with nearly fifty percent of the most
frequently used standard size light bulbs.' Customers paid for their use
of electricity, but paid no additional charge for the light bulbs.' 3'
The plaintiff, owner of a retail drugstore, challenged the light bulb pro-
gram as restraining competition in violation of the Sherman Act.' The defen-
dant argued that since the state regulatory commission required the light
bulb program to continue, it could not be liable for antitrust violations."3
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that:
[P]ublic utility regulation typically assumes that the private firm is a natural
monopoly and that public controls are necessary to protect the consumer
from exploitation. There is no logical inconsistency between requiring such
a firm to meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural
monopoly powers and also to comply with antitrust standards to the extent
that it engages in business activity in competitive areas of the economy.,
Thus, the Court indicated that natural monopolists, even those subject to
regulatory controls, must be policed for possible antitrust violations when
entering a competitive market.'"
The district court in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.'' addressed a similar leveraging issue when it reviewed the litigants'
proposed consent decree. The case involved the government's contention that
AT&T engaged in anticompetitive practices in its intercity telephone market.', 2
The court noted that the government's accusations of antitrust practices were
possibly due to AT&T's control over local exchange facilities. ' The court
133. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
134. Id. at 582.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 581.
138. Id. at 594. The defendant based its argument on the fact that the light bulb distribution
program could not be discontinued without the approval of the Michigan Public Service Com-
mission. Id. Thus, the defendant argued that under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942),
its actions were exempt from antitrust liability. In Parker, the court held that action which
would result in a private person violating the antitrust laws would not violate the Sherman
Act if taken by a state official pursuant to express legislative command. Id. at 350-51. The
Cantor court held that the Parker exemption did not apply to private utilities. 428 U.S. at 391-92.
139. 428 U.S. at 595-96.
140. Id. at 597 n.35. The Court stated that there was no doubt that the federal antitrust
laws apply to electric utilities. The Court held that neither state approval of a program nor
the need to apply to the state to abstain from the program exempted an electric utility from
the antitrust laws. Id. at 598.
141. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub. nom., Maryland v. United States, 103 S.
Ct. 1240 (1983).
142. 552 F. Supp. at 161.
143. Id. at 162.
19841
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
ultimately approved the decree which divested AT&T of the Bell Operating
Companies. 144
The ease with which a natural monopolist can extend its power into other
areas is amply demonstrated in the Detroit Edison and AT&T cases. The
potential abuses surrounding the exercise of a firm's natural monopoly power
suggests that courts must carefully scrutinize a natural monopolist's efforts
to compete in other markets.
C. Natural Monopoly as a Defense to Antitrust Violations
A defendant may assert the defense of natural monopoly to justify a variety
of anticompetitive practices. The defense has considerable appeal to a jury,
since the defendant would argue that economic forces inevitably would result
in the defendant becoming the sole supplier for the given market.'", The
defense also can maintain that duplicated efforts and other inefficiencies of
production would result during the elimination bout.
An analysis of the case law and other issues raised above, however,
indicates that considerable danger to consumer welfare lurks in the natural
monopoly defense. An extremely liberal interpretation of the defense may
reach too far in permitting anticompetitive activity. On the other hand, con-
sumer welfare will suffer from an overly restrictive interpretation of the
defense. Consumer losses will flow principally from delay in realizing lowest
cost productions, because natural economic forces, absent government
intervention or collusion among competitors, will ultimately produce the
desired result of one producer.' 4 6 The cost of an overly broad defense that
may permit anticompetitive activity must be balanced against the costs of
an overly restrictive defense, which may result in an unnecessarily long elimina-
tion bout between competitors in a natural monopoly market.
One principal danger of an extremely liberal interpretation of the defense
lies in the fact that the perceived natural monopoly market may be defined
at one point in time but invention and innovation may alter the market.'"7
If new technologies are developed that could provide alternative products
or services, the perceived natural monopolist may be able to preserve its
position through anticompetitive practices simply because it gained a
monopoly at a time when no alternative was available.
For example, generation of electricity is traditionally viewed as a natural
monopoly. New alternative energy sources may, however, be able to pro-
144. Judge Greene approved the full details of the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) on August
5, 1983. United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1983). The term
MFJ refers to the relationship between this order and the original consent decree between AT&T
and the Justice Department in 1956. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956). For a review of the MFJ, see Lavey & Carlton, Economic
Goals and Remedies of the AT&T Modified Final Judgment, 71 GEO. L.J. 1497 (1983).
145. See Austin, supra note 7, at 624-27, 644-45.
146. Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 4, at 305.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
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vide a similar product. The new competitor may be unable to survive a com-
petitive battle with a natural monopolist who utilizes anticompetitive prac-
tices, and innovative technology may be lost. A natural monopoly should
not be a defense in these cases.
The second principal danger of a liberal interpretation of the natural
monopoly defense is the possibility that the natural monopolist may use its
monopoly power in the natural monopoly market to gain control of a market
which is not a natural monopoly. Both the Detroit Edison and AT&T deci-
sions bear witness to the reality of the danger of leveraging, especially in
regulated industries."4 8 Thus, the defense of natural monopoly does not, and
should not, apply in such cases.
A third danger to consumer welfare from an overly broad defense is the
potential harm caused when a less efficient, higher cost competitor achieves
the position of monopoly power through anticompetitive practices. A brief
example bears this out. Assume that two firms, A and B, are competing
in a natural monopoly market. Firm A is the more efficient producer, and
at any given quantity of output, A has lower cost production than B. Firm
B, however, has substantial financial resources, while the resources of firm
A are fairly limited.
If firm B is allowed to use anticompetitive practices without restriction,
it may choose, for example, to price below average variable cost and thereby
gain market share. As it gains market share in a decreasing cost industry,
its costs will fall and it will be able to drive out the more efficient com-
petitor. Thus, firm B, although the less efficient, higher cost competitor at
any given quantity of output, may gain the natural monopoly simply because
firm A lacked the financial resources to survive an unfair elimination bout.
Consumers would be better off if the more efficient firm A were to be the
surviving monopolist. For consumers, the fact that firm B prevails is
undesirable, and yet, may occur if the competitive battle is not monitored.
Balanced against these fears is the reality that a natural market itself creates
conditions which make specific intent to gain monopoly power, its posses-
sion, and its exercise inevitable. Subjecting defendants to section two liability
in the natural monopoly setting without taking this reality into account would
be unfair to the competitors in such a market. In some cases, it may also
result in diminished consumer welfare because of the prolongation of the
elimination bout. To determine whether the prolongation of the elimination
bout will lead to net social losses, two consideration must be balanced.
During the elimination bout, the competitors are sharing the market and
neither is realizing the lowest cost production attainable by one firm pro-
ducing for the entire market. Thus the prolongation of the elimination bout
delays the realization of the lowest cost production and consumer welfare
is diminished. On the other hand, during the elimination bout, the com-
petitors may compete with one another on price, driving it downward. Once
148. See supra text accompanying notes 131-44.
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the monopoly is achieved, the monopolist will set a monopoly price, perhaps
constrained by a calculation of a limit price which will deter any potential
entrant. The monopoly price charged by a single low cost firm may be higher
than the price resulting from competition among high cost firms.
The specific market itself will dictate the decision in a particular case.
In a natural monopoly market, where natural forces, absent collusion or
government intervention, will inevitably lead to a monopoly, the prolonga-
tion of the elimination bout may not necessarily lead to net social losses.
The welfare losses of the monopoly price must be compared to the welfare
gains from the realization of lowest cost production.
One commentator points out that the probabilities are that the monopoly
price charged by the low-cost firm will be lower than the price resulting
from competition among high-cost firms.' 4 ' The fact that the social benefit
of the natural monopolist's resource savings is unambiguous should also weigh
heavily in any balance with uncertain price effects. Finally, the antitrust laws
generally seek to promote price cutting in concentrated markets, not hinder
it, and any effort to protect higher-cost competing firms from lower-cost
producers could chill price cutting generally.150
The overall goal must be to strike a balance in assessing the application
of the natural monopoly defense. Courts must address the fears concerning
the natural monopoly defense, yet permit it in the appropriate circumstance.
A principled approach must focus on market definition as well as the acts
which will subject a natural monopolist to section two liability. Considera-
tion of the acts which should trigger a monopolization charge for a natural
monopolist will help guide consideration of the issue of market definition.
The evaluation of the acts which may trigger a monopolization charge
in this type of market also must take into account that there are other
methods of policing elimination bouts, without calling into play the antitrust
laws and the concomitant threat of treble damages. Laws regulating unfair
trade practices such as section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act,' 5
unfair and deceptive trade practices laws,' as well as section one of the
Sherman Act,' 3 all provide potential weapons to police unfair competition
in the natural monopoly market.
149. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON.
REv. 18, 21-23 (1968). A small reduction in the monopolist's cost relative to that of high-cost
competitive firms would mean a monopoly price that is lower than the competitive price. Id.
150. Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economies, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 530 (1983).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982). The statute, in part, provides: "Unfair methods of com-
petition in or affecting commerce . .. are declared unlawful." Id.
152. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2101-2114 (Supp. 1982) (Delaware Antitrust Act);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to -11 (1983) (Illinois Antitrust Act); MINN. STAT. § 325D
(1982) (restraint of trade); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1983)
(monopoly).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section one states:
Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states ... is hereby declared to be illegal. . ..
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The difficulty lies in drawing the line between those acts which will sub-
ject the natural monopolist to section two liability and those acts which will
be left to other less onerous forms of legal sanction. The three classifica-
tions below attempt to characterize different types of anticompetitive behavior
and the consequences that should result.
In the clearest case of a natural monopoly, only the most egregious
anticompetitive conduct, such as section one violations, like vertical or
horizontal price fixing' or classic boycotts,'" should be serious enough to
be deemed a violation of section two. Despite the inevitable result of one
supplier in the natural monopoly market, a competitor could not provide
legitimate business justifications for this type of conduct and the applica-
tion of section two is clearly in order.' 56
Less flagrant, but still very clear anticompetitive practices may also trigger
section two liability if it can be shown that this conduct significantly con-
tributed to the monopoly position and the competitor cannot provide
legitimate business justifications for his acts. For example, exclusive dealing
154. Price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act and includes any "combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabiliz-
ing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce." United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); see also, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342 (1982) (price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (holding that an agreement among wholesalers
to refuse to sell unless retailer made payment in cash was anticompetitive, a per se violation
of the Sherman Act); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 515-16 (6th Cir. 1982) (Sherman
Act was violated when a monopolist manipulated prices in order to exclude competitors by
requiring them to sell below their average variable cost).
155. A boycott is an agreement among competitors to refuse to deal. Such an agreement
is illegal per se if it is a concerted attempt to reduce or exclude competition. See, e.g., Klor's
Inc. v. Bradway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts are forbidden by the
antitrust laws); Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1236 (7th Cir. 1982)
(illegal boycotts occur where some of the boycotters are competitors of the boycotted party
and the boycott is designed to protect boycotters from competing with the boycotted party),
aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984). But cf. United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n,
Inc., 665 F.2d 781, 788-89 (7th Cir. 1981) (trotting association's prohibition against its members
racing at non-member tracks was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act because there
was no showing of a purpose to exclude competitors).
156. Watson and Brunner conclude that "exclusionary conduct" which may trigger a find-
ing of willful monopolization under § 2 in other industries may not be sufficient in a regulated
public utility operating as a natural monopoly. They suggest three guidelines for consideration:
(1) conduct enforcing a clearly articulated public policy against competition should not be con-
sidered exclusionary conduct; (2) action or inaction required because of the regulated firm's
status as a public utility or common carrier should not be considered exclusionary; and (3)
reasonable actions taken by a regulated public utitlity to protect its ability to provide reliable,
efficient service to customers should not be considered exclusionary. Watson & Brunner,
Monopolization by Regulated "Monopolies": The Search for Substantive Standards, 22 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 559, 576-79 (1977), cited in MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
708 F.2d 1081, 1106, 1108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983) and Almeda Mall,
Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343, 354 n.21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 870 (1980).
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contracts,'" tying arrangements,' or patent violations'" might fall within
this category. Pricing below average variable cost presents a more difficult
question in a natural monopoly market. If the price results in increasing
demand, and thus increasing production, average variable costs, by defini-
tion, will fall in a natural monopoly market. A price which may be below
average variable cost at one point in time may be above average cost a short
period later as production is increased.
Finally, conduct which falls into a grey area, that which is not clearly
anticompetitive and does not significantly contribute to monopoly power,
should not subject the defendant to section two liability. Behavior such as
pricing between average variable cost and average total cost should not con-
stitute a violation of section two.' 60 Other conduct that may be expected
in an effort to capture a market, such as inflated claims of success,' 6 '
disparagement of a competitor's product,' 6 2 or hiring away high quality
personnel'6 should be permitted in an elimination bout for a natural
monopoly market.
157. An exclusive dealing contract exists when one firm agrees to buy only from another,
most commonly when a dealer agrees to handle only the goods of a particular manufacturer.
Exclusive dealing contracts are a form of vertical integration and as such, competition may
be injured through foreclosure of competitors. Thus, these types of arrangements may be violative
of the Sherman Act although they are not illegal per se. See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit
Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1173 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979) (plaintiff must
allege facts demonstrating that defendant-manufacturer's exclusive dealing arrangement foreclosed
competitors of defendant from a substantial market); Brown v. Hanson Publications, Inc.,
556 F.2d 969, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1977) (exclusive dealing contracts are not illegal per se and
preemptive purpose in such arrangements is not necessarily equivalent to specific intent to ex-
clude competition).
158. A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one product, but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product or at least agree that he
will not purchase that product from another supplier. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1558 (1984) (tying arrangements are invalid where seller exploits his
power to force a buyer to buy a tied product the buyer does not want or might have purchased
elsewhere); United States Steel Corp. v. Forter Enter., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (tying
arrangements are condemned where seller uses market power to force purchaser to do something
he would not do in a competitive market).
159. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177 (1965) (enforcing a fraudulently procured patent could result in a violation of § 2); American
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowd & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (enforcement
of a fraudulently procured patent is not a per se antitrust violation).
160. See International Air Ind. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 723 (5th Cir. 1975)
(price above average cost is fairly competitive), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Weber v.
Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1059 (D.N.J. 1977) (price above average cost is a competitive price).
161. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 728a (misrepresentation should be
presumed of little relevance for § 2 purposes).
162. Id. 738c (effects of disparagement upon a rival are speculative and should be ignored
for § 2 purposes); cf. Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 478 F. Supp. 1268, 1326
(D.N.J. 1979) (court found isolated instances of disparagement, but damages were not shown),
aff'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1980).
163. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 738d (compromising of rival's
employees should not be grounds for § 2 liability absent a continued pattern of similar behavior).
DEFENSE OF NATURAL MONOPOLY
Given the potential strength of the natural monopoly defense, which would
define more liberally the acts which a monopolist may undertake without
triggering a monopolization charge, the use of the defense should be carefully
limited to markets which are truly natural monopolies. A natural monopoly
should not be a defense to a section two charge without clear and convincing
evidence of the natural monopoly market. Clearly, with any of the three
types of activity discussed above, if the defendant failed to prove the existence
of the natural monopoly market, it could face potential section two liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where consumers are best served by the survival of the single most effi-
cient firm, merit-based competition should produce the desired result. Given
the uncertainties surrounding the identification of natural monopoly markets,
and the underlying purpose of the antitrust laws, if any error is to occur,
it should fall on the side of encouraging a fair elimination bout, rather than
an unfair competitive battle which may not ensure the desired result. A
natural monopolist must compete fairly for the market which it desires to
control. Prohibiting egregious anticompetitive acts will permit vigorous com-
petition on the merits in a natural monopoly market.
Although the concept of natural monopoly is widely-recognized in anititrust
litigation, its definition and application in judicial decisions has varied con-
siderably with little guidance in providing an analytical framework for future
decisions. Given the potential strength of such a defense, its use should be
limited to situations where there is clear and convincing evidence of the
natural monopoly market. Certain markets are natural monopolies, and where
they exist liability for less serious anticompetitive practice can be imposed
through state and federal laws designed to prevent unfair trade and business
practices. In such cases, the uncertain standards of liability and the severe
remedies of section two are appropriate.
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